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FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS, CONNECTIONS, LEND ME YOUR 
EARS: A NEW TEST FOR DETERMINING THE SUFFICIENCY 
OF SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA SOCIAL MEDIA* 
Christopher M. Finke** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of social media as a driving force in modern society 
has brought it to the forefront of legal discussion in all areas of law.1  
Fields of study such as evidence, ethics, and constitutional law are all 
currently wrestling with how social media ought to be handled.2  In 
particular, courts have attempted to determine whether service of 
process (or simply “service”) should be satisfied by the use of 
communication through social media.3 
Since 1950, courts have relied upon the same test, regardless of the 
method used, to determine the sufficiency of service: the Mullane 
test.4  Mullane as currently applied, however, does not sufficiently 
scrutinize service via social media in a manner conducive to 
 
 
* See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. 
** J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2017.  Special thanks to my 
wife for putting up with the craziness that is law school life, and to my parents for the 
opportunities they gave me by choosing homeschooling. 
1. See generally Keely Knapp, Comment, #Serviceofprocess @Socialmedia: Accepting 
Social Media for Service of Process in the 21st Century, 74 LA. L. REV. 547 (2014) 
(arguing that “[b]ecause of social media’s pervasiveness, the legal system would be 
doing itself an injustice to ignore this new technology as a means to effectuate service 
when other methods fail”). 
2. See, e.g., Laura E. Diss, Whether You “Like” It or Not: The Inclusion of Social Media 
Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control It, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 1841, 1846 (2013) (discussing the role of social media evidence in sexual 
harassment cases); Ethical Obligations for Attorneys Using Social Media, PA. BAR 
ASS’N (2014), http://www.danieljsiegel.com/Formal_2014-
300.pdf (discussing problems of legal ethics arising from the use of social media); 
Tehrim Umar, Comment, Total Eclipse of the Tweet: How Social Media Restrictions 
on Student and Professional Athletes Affect Free Speech, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 311, 312–313 (2015) (discussing social media in the field of 
constitutional law and arguing social media platforms are protected by the First 
Amendment).  
3. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015); Andrews v. 
McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 51 (Okla. 2014).  
4. See infra Section II.C. 
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understanding the peculiarities of this method of communication.5  
This Comment will not attempt to determine whether the use of 
social media to effect service of process is constitutional.6  Rather, it 
will show how the current application of the Mullane standard leads 
courts to categorically accept or reject service as effected, and, 
therefore, a new test ought to be adopted to measure the individual 
social media communication method used to attempt service.7  This 
test ought to be utilized to determine whether a particular use of a 
specific social media platform has fulfilled the constitutional 
requirements for service, vis-à-vis Mullane.8  
This Comment will begin by examining the standard for sufficient 
service of process established by the Supreme Court in Mullane, 
followed by the cases expanding that decision; in particular Greene v. 
Lindsey, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, and Jones v. 
Flowers.9  This Comment will also survey the technological 
advancements that have affected courts’ determinations regarding 
service.10  It will then observe how foreign courts have treated issues 
of electronic service, as well as review the development of this issue 
in the United States.11  Finally, this Comment will scrutinize current 
methods of service, propose a new test that courts ought to use to 
determine the sufficiency of service effected via social media, and 
compare the test’s advantages to the current test.12 
II. MULLANE AND ITS PROGENY 
A. Define: Service of Process 
Service of process is the system by which common law courts give 
defendants notice of the proceeding pending against them.13  When a 
suit is filed in a United States District Court, the plaintiff has a short 
 
5.  See infra Section IV.A. 
6. That is, constitutional by way of application of current service jurisprudence.  For 
further discussion about the constitutionality, see William Wagner & Joshua R. 
Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a Fair Method of Alternative Service, 
19 WIDENER L. REV. 259, 263–264 (2013). 
7. See infra Sections IV.A–IV.B. 
8. See infra Section IV.B. 
9. See infra Sections II.A–II.D. 
10. See infra Section II.D.2. 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Sections IV.A–IV.C. 
13.  See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: 
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 195 (2004). 
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amount of time in which he must notify the defendant.14  The 
procedure for giving this notice in federal courts is governed by Rule 
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15  For state suits, the 
procedures are governed by local law or rules similar to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.16  The Constitution requires that a certain 
floor be established for any process of supplying notice to be 
sufficient.17  
There are various types of service that have been acceptable, but 
two bear mentioning.  First, when a defendant is handed a set of 
service papers by someone else, that is termed “personal service” and 
it is preferable to nearly all other forms of service.18  Sending notice 
by certified mail has been almost universally accepted,19 whereas 
service by publication (i.e., publishing a notice in a newspaper over 
the period of a few weeks) has been acceptable only under certain 
circumstances.20  Any type of service not expressly enumerated by 
the federal or state rules of procedure is labeled “alternative 
service.”21 
B.  Providing Notice in the World Before Mullane 
The Supreme Court has long hinted that notice requirements may 
be an issue of constitutional rights.22  These ideas, however, have 
been tied to a confusing and unhelpful categorization of types of 
actions.23  Actions in rem had different service requirements than an 
 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (requiring defendants to be served within ninety days from the 
filing of the lawsuit). 
15.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)–(m). 
16.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that powers not delegated to the Federal 
Government are delegated to the States or to the people). 
17.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950) 
(declaring service of process a due process concern). 
18.  See Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail”™ from Meaning “You’ve 
Been Served”: How Service of Process by E–Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional 
Procedural Due Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2005). 
19.  See id. at 1144 n.175.  
20.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (holding that service is sufficient provided the notice is 
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action”).  
21. Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6 at 263–264. 
22.  See In re The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815) (“[I]t is a principle of natural 
justice, of universal obligation, that before the rights of an individual be bound by a 
judicial sentence, he shall have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings 
against him.”). 
23.  Id. (noting differences between notice of actions in personam and in rem); see also 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1877) (describing claims that are only “in the 
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action in personam.24  As law became more “settled,” the categories 
became more unsettling, with actions that clearly fit into in rem or in 
personam categories being distinguished from those “sometimes 
termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely 
still, ‘in the nature of a proceeding in rem.’”25  Such classifications 
were later determined unnecessary, as the demands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are independent from the categorization of the claim 
being brought.26  
C. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 
The Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co. melded prior notions of notice into a single 
coherent rule.27  The litigation in Mullane involved the notice 
requirements of a New York statute regulating the creation of 
common trust funds.28  The increasing costs of administering a small 
trust became overly burdensome during and following World War II, 
leading many states to allow the pooling of many small trusts into a 
single common trust fund to be administered by a single entity.29  The 
New York statute allowed the creation of a common fund, pending 
approval of a state board, from any number of smaller trusts held by a 
single trustee.30  A judicial settlement would establish the assets of 
 
nature of a proceeding in rem” rather than actually in rem, and allowing alternative 
service for such claims in particular circumstances).  The distinctions created by 
courts “concerned the presence of a person or thing and the type of notice required” to 
sustain that type of action.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982).  In personam actions required that the court have jurisdiction over, and 
notice be given to, a particular person.  See id.  In rem actions, by contrast, would 
impose legal liability only upon the physically present property which was the subject 
of the lawsuit.  Id.  Notice was given for this type of action when property was seized.  
See id.  Notice was formerly, therefore, a facet of personal jurisdiction.  See id.  With 
the various types of actions subsumed into the same set of requirements, these 
categories are effectively eliminated in personal jurisdiction analysis, Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977), and service of process analysis, see Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 312–13. 
24. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–34. 
25. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312. 
26. See id. at 312–13. 
27. Id. at 314.  For a general history of Mullane as well as the statute that the Supreme 
Court overturned, see John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common 
Trust Funds, and the Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1693, 1694 (2015). 
28.  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307. 
29.  Id. at 307–08. 
30. Id. at 308–09. 
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each individual owner to determine how much each investor should 
gain from the investment.31 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust established a common fund in 
1946.32  The following year, it petitioned the New York courts for 
settlement.33  One hundred thirteen small trusts were to be added to 
the common pool, with total investment dollars valued at 
approximately three million.34  The Court noted that the record was 
unclear as to how many individual beneficiaries there were and where 
those beneficiaries resided.35 
Notice to the beneficiaries of the petition was provided in 
compliance with the statute;36 the banking law required that notice be 
made to beneficiaries by publishing “the name and address of the 
trust company, the name and date of establishment of the common 
trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds” in a 
newspaper once a week for four weeks.37  In addition to the statutory 
demands, Central Hanover Bank mailed notices to the beneficiaries 
for which it readily had names and addresses.38  Mullane objected to 
the service of process as insufficient under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.39  The New York Surrogate Court presiding over the 
matter overruled the objection.40  On appeal, the Appellate Division 
and the Court of Appeals affirmed in turn.41 
Mullane argued to the Supreme Court that, under the doctrines of 
Pennoyer v. Neff,42 the trial court lacked jurisdiction.43  No property 
 
31. Id. at 309. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36.  Id. 
37. Id. at 309–10. 
38. Id. at 310. 
39. Id. at 310–11.  Mullane was appointed by the New York Surrogate Court to represent 
all persons known and unknown who had an interest in the income of the common 
trust fund.  Id. at 310.  Mullane was joined by James Vaughan, who represented those 
who had an interest in the principle.  Id. 
40. Id. at 311. 
41. Id. 
42. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878), held that service of process for in rem 
proceedings where the property is owned by a non-resident is only sufficient where 
the non-resident owner is given personal service.  In that case, the failure to provide 
personal service deprived the state court jurisdiction over the proceeding.  Id. 
43. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–12.  It was clear some of the beneficiaries were not 
residents of New York.  Id. at 309. 
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was under contest in the settlement of the common trust;44 the 
proceeding would have disposed of the beneficiaries’ right to sue the 
trustee of the common fund for negligence or breach of trust.45  
Without actual property under contest, the case would be categorized 
as an in personam proceeding, requiring the parties to have been 
notified via personal service.46  The Court, however, determined that 
“the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the 
standards are so elusive and confused generally . . . .”47  
Instead of relying on these unstable and inconsistent rules, the 
Court stated that constitutional notice requirements must meet a 
balance between two values: the interest of the state in resolving 
fiduciary issues and the interest of the individual as defined under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.48  The Court held that because the 
foundation of due process rights are in the right to be heard, notice is 
necessarily an element of due process, as it allows a person to 
“choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or 
contest.”49  The Court undertook the task of building an effective test 
to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient.50 
The Supreme Court determined that for service of process to 
comport with the Fourteenth Amendment, the method of notice must 
be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
 
44.  Id. at 313. 
45. Id. at 311. 
46. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727. 
47. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312. 
48.  But the vital interest of the State . . . can be served only if interests 
or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow 
be determined.  A construction of the Due Process Clause which 
would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could 
not be justified.  Against this interest of the State we must balance 
the individual interest sought to be protected . . . . “The 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to 
be heard.”  This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending . . . .  
 Id. at 313–14 (citations omitted). 
49. Id. at 314. 
50. Id. (“The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between 
these interests . . . .”); see also Jo-Leo W. Carney-Waterton, Note, The Postman Must 
Always Ring Twice: When Preliminary Attempts at Notice Are Unsuccessful, Is the 
State Obligated to Take Additional Reasonable Steps to Ensure That a Person 
Receives Adequate Notice?, 34 S.U. L. REV. 65, 79 (2007) (describing Mullane as “a 
seminal, if not watershed, case in the historical succession of cases on the issue of 
service”).  
2016 Service of Process via Social Media 145 
 
opportunity to present their objections.”51  The analysis came in two 
parts.  First, the notice must reasonably convey the information 
necessary for the defendant to respond.52  Second, the notice must be 
received in such time as to give the defendant time to respond.53  And 
with that, the old demarcations between proceeding types and notice 
requirements were gone.54  This test remains the test used today.55  
Ultimately, the Court held that notice was sufficient regarding the 
beneficiaries who could not be found with reasonable diligence.56  
Because contact information for those individuals could not be found, 
it was reasonable under the circumstances that publication would be 
the most effective method to convey the information about the 
settlement proceeding.57  For those beneficiaries for whom Hanover 
Central did have contact information, however, it was determined 
that service was not sufficient.58  The known beneficiaries could have 
been contacted by mail to alert them of the settlement of the trusts, 
just as they had been notified a few years earlier to alert them of the 
creation of the common trust.59  
The Mullane test was meant to be flexible.60  The Court explicitly 
considered the practical considerations of a strict test and rejected it 
for those same reasons.61  This flexibility is not unlimited, as “a mere 
gesture is not due process.”62  Yet, a party is only required to provide 
notice to the extent “that the form chosen is not substantially less 
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary 
 
51. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
52. Id.; see also Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2005). 
53. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison Cty., 665 F.3d 
408, 434–35 (2d Cir. 2011). 
54. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, 
but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the 
subject with which the statute deals.” (quoting American Land Co. v. Seiss, 219 U.S. 
47, 67 (1911))).  But see Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1982). 
55. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006). 
56. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. 
57. Id. at 317–18.  The Court explained that only “ordinary standards of diligence” would 
apply.  Id. at 317.  Even this diligence would be seen through the context “of the 
character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests . . . involved . . . .”  Id.  
58. Id. at 318. 
59. Id. at 319. 
60. See id. at 315 (“The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just 
and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with 
which the statute deals.” (quoting Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911))). 
61. Id. at 314–15. 
62. Id. at 315. 
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substitutes.”63  This element of reasonableness allows for various 
methods of service to find use and to be considered equally with 
other methods.64 
D. Service Through the Years Since Mullane 
Because the test laid down in Mullane was meant to be flexible,65 
development of service jurisprudence was necessary.66  The contours 
of what would, or would not, sufficiently effect service would 
become a point of discussion for the court over a series of cases 
through the next few decades.67  The Court created this task for itself 
by rejecting a stricter test.68  This element of reasonableness, 
however, allowed the Court with room enough to accept new 
methods of service, while protecting the rights of defendants.69 
 1.    The Development of Service Jurisprudence 
The Court explored the contours of the test it laid down in the years 
to follow.70  The Mullane test, however, did not face its first true 
challenge until a string of cases reached the Supreme Court in the 
early 1980s.71  Evictions, along with other real estate related financial 
 
63. Id. (emphasis added).  The Court faced a similar issue in Walker v. Hutchinson City, 
352 U.S. 112, 115–16 (1956). 
64.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 319. 
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
66.  See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) 
67.  See infra note 71. 
68. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15. 
69.  See id. 
70. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13–14, n.13 (1978); 
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211, 212–13 (1962); Walker v. City of 
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115–16, 116 n.5 (1956).  The Court in Walker rejected 
notice by publication for condemnation proceedings.  352 U.S. at 117.  Schroeder, 
relying on Walker and City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. 
Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1952), rejected the use of a town paper and signs posted 
around town (but not on the property in question) to provide notice to a landowner 
during proceedings to divert a river when the landowner’s name and address could 
have easily been ascertained from town records.  371 U.S. at 211.  Finally, in Craft, 
the court entered into a lengthy discussion of due process to determine that the “final 
notice” mailed to the Crafts was sufficient to alert them that the gas and electricity 
supplies would be terminated, but not that the Crafts had the opportunity to object to 
the billing.  436 U.S. at 13.  Therefore, the Crafts’ rights in this regard were not 
foreclosed.  Id. 
71. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795–96 (1983); Greene v. 
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 447, 448–50 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 
U.S. 422, 428–29 (1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 517 (1982).  Greene 
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issues, pressed the Court to explore the deeper meaning of the 
Mullane test.72  
In Greene v. Lindsey, the Court was faced with the eviction of 
various inhabitants of apartments operated by the Housing Authority 
of Louisville, Kentucky.73  The Housing Authority began detainer 
actions for repossession in 1975.74  If the defendant could not be 
found by the local police to effect personal service, state law directed 
the police to leave a copy of the notice with someone in the residence 
or post a copy “in a conspicuous place on the premises.”75  The 
evicted tenants alleged never to have seen the postings or even have 
learned of the eviction until a default judgment had already been 
entered against them.76  
The district court dismissed Lindsey’s case on cross-motions for 
summary judgment because of a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case, 
which predated the Mullane test.77  On review, the Court of Appeals 
reversed based on Mullane.78  Greene argued that because the action 
sits under the in rem category, notice by public posting is adequate 
under Pennoyer.79  The Supreme Court determined this argument to 
be inapposite and agreed with the Court of Appeals.80 
The Supreme Court again rejected the notion that questions of 
service ought to be determined by the property or person 
categorization of the case.81  While the Court noted that posting 
notice of eviction would generally be enough to satisfy due process,82 
this particular reliance on posting notices did not satisfy 
constitutional requirements.83  The Court stated that these particular 
process servers were well aware that such notices were often 
 
and Adams hold the most regard of the four, and therefore, only those two cases will 
be discussed here. 
72. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (tax sale); Adams, 462 U.S. at 792–93 
(tax sale); Greene, 456 U.S. at 447 (eviction). 
73. Greene, 456 U.S. at 446. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 454.030 (1975)). 
76. Id. at 446–47. 
77. Id. at 447 (citing Weber v. Grand Lodge of Ky., F. & A. M., 169 F. 522 (6th Cir. 
1909)). 
78. Id. at 448–49. 
79. See id. at 450; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
80. Greene, 456 U.S. at 456. 
81. Id. at 450 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 
(1950)). 
82. Id. at 452. 
83. Id. at 453. 
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removed by other people in the common areas in which the notices 
were posted.84   
The Court combined this information with other factors to grade 
the reasonableness test outlined in Mullane.85  A more reasonably 
calculated method to give notice would have been to send the notice 
by mail.86  Mailing the notice would be “efficient and inexpensive” 
and was a method “upon which prudent men will ordinarily rely in 
the conduct of important affairs.”87  Ultimately, the Court held that, 
“where an inexpensive and efficient mechanism . . . is available to 
enhance the reliability of an otherwise unreliable notice procedure,” 
 
84. Id. at 453–54.  Evidence in the record demonstrated that the individuals charged with 
posting notice had personal knowledge that children from the apartment complex 
often removed similar postings at the location of the eviction.  Id.  Footnote 7 of the 
opinion includes the following exchange during a deposition:  
   The children-we had problems with children.  They would take 
[the writs] off.  They never took them off when we were 
present, but we, you know, assume-the Housing Authority told 
us that they would take them off, so we always put them up 
high. 
Q. Did you ever see kids pulling them off? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you see many? 
A. No, not too many.  I did see it in one place over there. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. Village West. 
Q. How many times did you see that happen? 
A. Well, probably a couple of times. 
Q. . . . Were you aware of there being any problem with 
children ripping the Writs off? 
A. Oh, we had plenty of trouble. 
Q. You had trouble? 
A. With kids, yeah.  Yeah. 
Q. Did you ever see kids ripping them off? 
A. Yeah.  I have seen them take them off of the door and I 
would go back and tell them to put it back.  They don’t know.  
They didn’t know.  They just- 
Q. Were there any particular places where you saw kids 
ripping them off the doors? 
A. Well most of that was in Village West.  
Id. at 453 n.7 (citations omitted). 
85. Id. at 454 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315). 
86. See id. at 455–56. 
87. Id. at 455 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319). 
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continued reliance upon the ineffective means does not meet the 
Mullane standard for sufficiency of notice.88 
About a year later, the Supreme Court once again set out to explore 
the due process requirements of service of process.89  In Mennonite 
Board of Missions v. Adams, a tax sale gave rise to the issue of 
service.90  The Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) sold a parcel of 
land to Alfred Jean Moore on mortgage.91  According to the terms of 
the agreement, Moore was to pay the taxes on the land;92 she failed to 
do so and the property went to sale.93  The county initiated the 
procedure for the tax sale, posted and published notice, and sent 
notice via certified mail to Moore.94  Without a response from Moore, 
the property was sold to Adams at an auction.95  MBM, although the 
owner of the property, was never notified of the impending tax sale.96 
When MBM finally found out about the tax sale, the redemption 
period had already run, leaving litigation as the only option to regain 
the property.97  When MBM contended that notice was not sufficient, 
the trial court rejected the argument and upheld the state statute 
requiring the outlined notice process.98  Indiana’s highest court 
affirmed that decision, but the Supreme Court reversed.99 
The Court again rejected the use of service by publication because 
a more reliable means of communication was available.100  The 
state’s failure to utilize an effective, yet reasonable, means of notice 
 
88. Id. at 455–56 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319). 
89. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 794–95 (1983). 
90. Id. at 795. 
91. Id. at 792. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 794. 
94. See id.  Moore was the mortgagee and therefore, not the actual owner of the property.  
Id. at 792.  Note, however, that this case, decided only a year after Greene, 
incorporated the method of service expressly held in Greene to be an acceptable 
alternative to posting. 
95. Id. at 794. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 794–95. 
98. Id. at 795. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 799.  The Court did not address the use of certified mail for notice because the 
letter would have only given Moore the required notice.  Because MBM was the 
owner of the property, it was entitled to the notice.  See id. at 792.  Moore was a mere 
mortgagee.  Id.  The certified mail would have no effect on service requirements for 
MBM.  Ergo, only the publication remained for the Court to consider. See id. at 793 
(illustrating that certified mail should have been sent to the owner of the property, not 
the resident).  The mailed notice was sent to Moore.  Id. at 794. 
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invoked the ire of the Court: “[I]t does not follow that the [s]tate may 
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of providing 
notice by mail to parties who are particularly resourceful.”101  
Furthermore, “a State must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, 
under all circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.’”102  The county’s use of publication, when direct 
mail to the owner of the property is still “an inexpensive and efficient 
mechanism,”103 led the Court to hold that the local government did 
not demonstrate the intended desire to actually inform the party of the 
proceedings.104 
The Court also rejected the contention that a party must take steps 
to “safeguard its interests.”105  The Court stated that even a 
sophisticated party, such as MBM, is not required to go out of their 
own way to protect their property interests;106 rather, it is the 
responsibility of the party providing notice to do so in accordance 
with due process requirements.107  The county’s easy access to tax 
records—and hence MBM’s mailing address—made it clear to the 
Court that the “minimum constitutional precondition” of notice was 
not satisfied.108 
Adams, however, went beyond the mere affirmance of the Mullane 
rule.109  The Court in Adams clarified that the accuracy of the 
delivery of service and intent of the delivering party are factors to be 
considered in the analysis.110  The reasonableness of the method of 
 
101. Id. at 799–800. 
102. Id. at 795 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950)).  Even though the parcel was occupied by Moore, her use of the land was 
based upon a mortgage.  Under Indiana law at the time, the mortgagee still retained a 
property interest in the parcel.  Id. at 798.  Therefore, due process protections are 
triggered, including service of process requirements.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
103.  Adams, 462 U.S. at 799 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982)). 
104. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315). 
105. Id. 
106.  Id. 
107. Id. at 799–800. 
108. Id. at 800. 
109.  Compare id. at 799–800 (expanding the Mullane analysis by discussing the accuracy 
of and the intent behind service of process), with Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 
(establishing a flexible service of process test which requires the method of service to 
be reasonable). 
110. Adams, 462 U.S. at 799–800 (emphasizing that particular methods of service do not 
demonstrate a desire to provide notice to a party and that accuracy of service is 
essential despite the sophistication of the party). 
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service, therefore, was to include both objective factors111 and 
subjective factors.112 
The passing of years has not relegated the Mullane test to collect 
dust on law library shelves.113  A situation of divorce allowed the 
Supreme Court the chance to halt the extension of the Mullane test in 
2006.114  The plaintiff, Jones, moved out of his Arkansas home and 
into an apartment in Little Rock.115  Nevertheless, he continued to 
pay the mortgage for the home, and the mortgagor would in turn pay 
the property taxes for the home every year.116  After thirty years the 
mortgage was paid off, leaving the property taxes to the 
responsibility of the owner.117  Three years later, the state sent a letter 
to the home to notify Jones that the property taxes for the home were 
delinquent.118  The letter would have informed Jones that the property 
would be sold if the taxes remained unpaid for two more years;119 
unfortunately, no one was present at the home to receive the letter 
and it was returned as “unclaimed.”120  Shortly before the date of the 
sale, the state published a notice of the public sale in a local 
newspaper.121  Flowers negotiated a purchase for barely a quarter of 
the market value of the house.122  The state sent another notice to the 
home in an attempt to contact Jones, but the letter was again returned 
unclaimed.123  
Jones filed suit for the state’s failure to provide notice and 
deprivation of property without due process of law.124  On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the 
state’s actions were proper, denying Jones’s motion and granting 
Flowers’s motion.125  The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment that the state tax sale statute complied with due 
 
111. See id. at 799. 
112. See id.; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1982). 
113.  See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 238 (2006). 
114. Id. at 238. 
115. Id. at 223. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119.  Id. 
120. Id. at 223–24. 
121. Id. at 224. 
122. Id.  Flowers negotiated for approximately twenty-one thousand dollars.  Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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process requirements regarding service.126  The Supreme Court, 
however, reversed.127 
In a “new wrinkle,” the Court noted that precedent clearly required 
state governments to take action beyond what is normally required 
when it is known that the notice failed to reach the intended 
recipient.128  The Court found that since the state’s certified letter was 
returned unclaimed, it would be proper for the Court to inquire “what 
the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed” before 
determining the reasonability of the notice.129 
The Court held that the state’s lack of further conduct was 
unreasonable.130  Prior to the sale of the land, the state learned that its 
method of notice had actually failed.131  The Court analogized the 
returned letter to the state officer handing a stack of letters to a 
postman, see that postman drop the letters down a storm drain, and do 
nothing.132  “Failure[,]” wrote Chief Justice Roberts, “to follow up 
would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were 
reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when 
delivered to the postman.”133  Failure to take additional action 
demonstrated that the state was not “desirous of actually informing” 
the defendant Jones.134   
Just as in Adams, the state in Jones argued that ignorance of the law 
is no excuse: the owner of property should know that a tax sale 
ensues from a failure to pay taxes.135  Again, the Court rejected this 
argument because it was the state’s burden to serve the opposing 
party.136  
The Court further held that there were viable alternatives to the use 
of certified mail.137  The use of regular mail would allow the letter “to 
 
126. Id. at 225. 
127. Id. at 239. 
128. Id. at 227, 230 (“In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice . . . was inadequate 
when the State knew that the property owner was in prison. . . .  In Covey v. Town of 
Somers, we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was 
inadequate when town officials knew that the property owner was incompetent and 
without a guardian’s protection.”) (citations omitted). 
129. Id. at 227, 231. 
130. See id. at 234–35. 
131. Id. at 223–24. 
132. Id. at 229. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 230. 
135. See id. at 231–32; Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983). 
136. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 233 (using Miranda rights as an example of well-known rights 
that must still be respected by government actors). 
137.  See id. at 234–35. 
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be examined at the end of the day” rather than only “retrieved from 
the post office.”138  The state, however, was not required to check 
local income tax rolls or other records.139  Requiring this would place 
too great a burden with little return, because a certified letter marked 
“unclaimed” denotes only that no one was home, not that it was the 
wrong address.140 
Jones defined how broadly the actual knowledge of a party may be 
drawn out.141  The reasonably calculated notice may be reasonably 
calculated when it was used, but if it is shown that actual notice was 
not effected, a follow up of some kind is required on risk of failing to 
demonstrate a desire to effect service.142 
 2.    Bringing New Technology into the Fold 
Courts generally have to play “catch up” with the application of 
legal doctrines regarding service due to the ever-changing 
technological landscape.143  As discussed above, the Supreme Court 
readily accepted the use of both regular and certified mail as 
acceptable methods of service.144  Generally, the acceptance of other 
methods of service has been left to lower courts to decide.145  Federal 
trial courts accepted the use of telex machines during the Iranian 
crises of the 1980s to serve businesses whose assets were being 
attached for suit.146  Likewise, federal courts have also allowed fax 
communication when that method was provided by a defendant as the 
primary method of communication.147  The defendant in Broadfoot 
was adamant that all communication between him and the plaintiff 
 
138. Id. at 235. 
139. Id. at 236. 
140. Id.  
141.  See id. at 225. 
142. See id. at 230. 
143. See, e.g., Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713, 721 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).  The court allowed service via fax machine decades after the 
creation of the first commercially available fax machine.  Id.; see The History of 
Fax—from 1843 to Present Day, FAX AUTHORITY, http://faxauthority.com/fax-history/ 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
144. See supra Section II.D.1. 
145.  See generally New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he [Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act] provides that if the other methods of service are unavailable, the 
court may fashion a mode of service ‘consistent with the law of the place where 
service is to be made.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976))). 
146. Id. at 81. 
147. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721. 
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was to be conducted through fax.148  In the use of these two 
technologies, courts were spared from considering a dueling of 
method reliability because telex or fax were “the only means of 
communication” available between the two parties.149  Because of the 
unique circumstances and limited availability of alternative methods 
of communication, and thus methods by which to serve process, both 
courts held service to be sufficient.150 
Electronic mail (email) was incorporated in Rio Properties v. Rio 
International Interlink, a groundbreaking case decided by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002.151  That court allowed service via 
email, a holding noted by the court to be “upon untrodden ground.”152  
No prior decision by a federal appeals court had ever addressed 
service of process by email.153  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the 
facts relied heavily on the defendant’s structuring of its business 
“such that it could be contacted only via its email address.”154  
Therefore, the courts were again spared from grappling with dueling 
service options.155  The Ninth Circuit recognized that email had its 
limitations: proof of receipt problems, compatibility issues, and 
“[i]mprecise imaging technology” making official documents 
difficult to read.156  Nevertheless, the appeals court trusted in a 
district court’s ability to “balance the limitations of email service 
against its benefits in any particular case,” and declared the service 
sufficient.157 
Some courts have gone to the extreme to provide service to a 
defendant.158  In July 2015, the Domestic Violence Unit of the D.C. 
Superior Court engineered an interesting solution to a defendant 
attempting to evade service.159  The defendant had managed to evade 
 
148. See id. at 718 (“From now on, you may contact me by FAX . . . .” (alteration in 
original) (quoting the Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 11)). 
149. Id. at 718–20; see New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 74. 
150. See New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 74; Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 719. 
151. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 
152. Id. at 1017. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1018. 
155.  See id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1018–19. 
158.  See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
159. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, Case No. 2015-CPO 002, at *1–3 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
July 29, 2015) (order granting temporary protective order), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
lawgical/assets/data/2730/original.pdf, noted in Kimberly Faber, Defendant Served 
Temporary Protective Order via Text Message, SERVE NOW (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.serve-now.com/articles/2112/defendant-served-temporary-protective-
order-via-text-message. 
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more than twelve service attempts of varying methods.160  The judge 
determined the numerous attempts to be demonstrative of the 
plaintiff’s diligence.161  The court decided the best, and perhaps only, 
way to effect service via a means reasonably calculated to provide 
notice was to send the notice via a text message.162 
Social media has become the next layer of technology to be used to 
effect service of process.163  Facebook,164 Twitter,165 LinkedIn,166 and 
other websites all sit within this realm of digital interaction.  
Facebook boasts 1.71 billion monthly active users who can interact 
with other users through pictures, video, text, documents, webpage 
hyperlinks, etc.167  Facebook also offers flexibility in that it can be 
connected to various platforms or even other social media services.168  
Twitter users are more limited in their communication as messages 
are restricted to one hundred forty characters or less.169  Even still, 
the so-called “microblogging service” nets more than three hundred 
million users.170  LinkedIn, while very similar to other services, 
garnered more than four hundred million users due to its different 
 
160. Id. at *2–3. 
161. Id. at *4–5. 
162. See id. at *5–6. 
163. See Lisa McManus, Service of Process Through Facebook, LEXISNEXIS (Nov. 9, 
2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/legal-technology-and-
social-media/archive/2011/11/09/service-of-process-through-
facebook.aspx?Redirected=true; Service of Process via Social Media Becoming a 
Reality?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 18, 2013), http://bna.com/service-process-via-
b17179872848/. Social media is defined as any form of electronic communication 
through which people interact with one another through various communications and 
communities.  See Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
164. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  
165. TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
166. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
167. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 2016 (in 
Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-
active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
168. See id. 
169. Number of Monthly Active Twitter Users Worldwide from 1st Quarter 2010 to 2nd 
Quarter 2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/numb
er-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
170. Id. 
156 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
purpose.171  LinkedIn acts as a way to create professional 
relationships, search for jobs, or replace hard copy résumés.172   
III. CURRENT TREATMENT OF SERVICE VIA SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
A. International Treatment 
Nations around the world have been dealing with the issue of 
service via social media for years.173  The United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have all approved service via 
social media in certain cases.174  Of note, the Australian decision 
allowed service of a default judgment via Facebook where the 
biographical information of an account matched prior known 
biographical information of the defendants.175  Each of the decisions 
held concerns for accuracy, but every time the court allowed service 
via social media because of the parties’ inability to contact the 
defendant.176  
B.  Domestic Treatment 
Courts in the United States have been lukewarm to the idea of 
effecting service via social media.177  They have not, however, 
entirely rejected the idea.178  In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, a New York 
trial court examined the possibility of service via Facebook.179  The 
plaintiff had attempted to serve her husband with a divorce summons, 
but he refused to meet and his last known address had been empty for 
 
171. See Number of Monthly Active LinkedIn Members from 1st Quarter 2009 to 2nd 
Quarter in 2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/274050/qu
arterly-numbers-of-linkedin-members/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
172. Id. 
173. See Court Order Served over Twitter, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8285954.stm (last updated Oct. 1, 2009, 17:44 
GMT). 
174. Michael C. Lynch, You’ve Been ‘Poked’! ‘PCCare247’ and Service of Process by 
Social Media, 249 N.Y. L.J. (2013), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/
1728/_res/id=Files/index=0/1728.pdf. 
175. Id. 
176. See Pedram Tabibi, Facebook Notification – You’ve Been Served: Why Social Media 
Service of Process May Soon Be a Virtual Reality, 7 PHX. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2013). 
177. See Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla. 
2014); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 
2086950, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012). 
178. See FTC. v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *5–6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 713–14, 716 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
179. 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713–14, 716. 
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years.180  With the defendant evading service and no accurate address 
to send a letter to, the court had few other choices.181  The court, 
citing New York rules that allow other methods of service provided 
that the method can be shown to satisfy the Mullane test,182 allowed 
the plaintiff to follow through with her proposed method of service—
sending the summons to the defendant’s Facebook account via a 
private message.183  Just as Rio Properties noted that email service 
was “untrodden ground,”184 the court in Baidoo stated that allowing 
social media service would be “beyond the safe harbor of statutory 
prescription.”185  Even so, the trial judge found that, because the 
plaintiff was able to show with reasonable certainty that the account 
was used by the defendant and that publication was less likely to 
reach the defendant, the use of Facebook to provide service passed 
constitutional due process requirements.186 
In FTC v. PCCare247, the federal district court wrestled with 
whether service by both email and social media would be sufficient 
for a foreign defendant.187  The defendants were alleged to have run a 
fraudulent business charging Americans for “fixing” problems with 
their computers.188  Even though a different Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure applies to international defendants,189 both analyses must 
look to whether due process is satisfied by the method of service.190  
Service by Facebook message alone would bring a “substantial 
question” for consideration, particularly because of the ability to fake 
profile information.191  The plaintiff’s use, however, of email and 
significant facts which demonstrated that the targeted account would 
be the correct one, assuaged the court’s fears.192  Notably, the court 
stated that “courts must remain open to considering requests to 
 
180. Id. at 712. 
181. See id. at 713. 
182.  Id. at 712. 
183. Id. at 715. 
184. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002). 
185. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713. 
186. Id. at 715–16. 
187. See FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
188. Id.  
189. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (rules of service for international defendants); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) 
(rules of service for domestic defendants). 
190. See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *2 (quoting SEC v. Anticevic, No. 5 CV 6991 
(KMW), 2009 WL 361739, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009) (citation omitted)). 
191. Id. at *5. 
192. Id. at *5–6. 
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authorize service via technological means of then-recent vintage.”193  
This was especially important to the court because as defendants 
become more involved in modern technology, it more closely 
“comports with due process to serve them by those means.”194 
Likewise, the court in Who’sHere, Inc. v. Orun dealt with a foreign 
defendant.195  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed upon 
its trademark.196  The defendant was in contact with the plaintiff, but 
only through electronic means.197  The plaintiff asked the court to 
allow service by both email and social media.198  This time, however, 
the court recognized that any of the individual methods of service 
would likely have been sufficient.199  The various factual supports, 
such as cross-references of the name and email from the account with 
information provided by the defendant, led the court to hold that 
service via social media was sufficient.200 
Not all courts have been as open-minded regarding service.201  In 
Fortunato v. Chase Bank, the court was concerned with the accuracy 
of the targeted account.202  The court declared social media service 
“unorthodox” and remained “skeptical” that delivery of the notice 
would actually apprise the recipient account of the proceedings 
against the party.203  Even though the defendant went through various 
other attempts to effect service, the court was leery of the defendant’s 
desire to actually provide notice.204  The court ordered service by 
publication in local newspapers.205 
In the only case on point to be opined upon by a jurisdiction’s 
highest court, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared that service 
via social media—Facebook in particular—categorically cannot be 
sufficient to provide service on par with constitutional 
requirements.206  An adoption case, Andrews, dealt with a father’s 
 
193. Id. at *5. 
194. Id.  
195. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 WL 670817, at *1 (E.D. 
Va. Feb. 20, 2014). 
196. Id.  
197. Id. 
198. Id. at *2. 
199. Id. at *4. 
200. Id. at *4–5. 
201.  See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012). 
202. Id. at *2–3. 
203. Id.  
204. Id.  
205. Id. at *3. 
206. See Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 51 (Okla. 2014). 
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loss of custody rights.207  The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
notice via Facebook does not comport with constitutional 
requirements.208  Even though the court could have created a narrow 
holding that there were other more reasonable methods of effecting 
service,209 the court decided to boldly state that “[t]his Court is 
unwilling to declare notice via Facebook alone sufficient to meet the 
requirements [of the federal and state constitutions] because . . . [i]t is 
. . . a mere gesture.”210  The court flatly rejected Facebook, and likely 
all other social media platforms, as a viable means of effecting 
service.211 
C. Future Proposals 
Ultimately, courts around the nation have decided the issue fairly 
evenly.212  Because of this disparity of answers, even in similar 
factual situations, some have called for changes to the way courts 
view the issue.213  Legislative enactments could be used to explicitly 
allow for service by electronic communication.214  Other advocates 
state that because electronic communication methods are reliable, 
traditional service should be dispensed with as “time-consuming, 
overly expensive, or unsuccessful.”215  The efficiency of electronic 
communication, combined with modern society’s reliance on such 
communication, often allows it to be a more reasonable method than 
traditional methods.216  At the very least, some scholars have noted 
that courts should use particular sets of factors to determine if a 
particular use of social media is sufficient.217  Often included are: (1) 
the nature of the media platform in relation to the needs of effective 
service; (2) the existence of corroborative evidence to verify accuracy 
 
207. Id. at 40–41.  
208. Id. at 50 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 
(1950)). 
209. The two parents had been in physical contact with one another during the proceeding 
and were even on speaking terms.  Id. at 51. 
210. Id. (first citing Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855, 862–63 (Okla. 2003); then citing 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315). 
211.  Id. 
212. See supra Section III.B. 
213. See Tabibi, supra note 176, at 39. 
214. See id. at 52–56. 
215. Svetlana Gitman, Comment, (Dis)Service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule 4 to 
Comply with Modern Usage of Technology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 470 (2012). 
216. See id. at 472–74. 
217. See Knapp, supra note 1 at 575–76.  
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in the targeted account; and (3) the existence of evidence that the 
targeted account is actually used.218 
IV. THE TEST 
A. Failures of Prior Tests 
The Mullane test’s flexibility allows it to move with the changing 
times.219  The various courts’ application of that test is not always as 
flexible as intended.220  The use of the three factors outlined above is 
strongly advocated when a court allows service by social media.221  
These factors alone, however, do not delve deeply enough into an 
understanding of the discrete particularities of each social media 
platform.222  Likewise, flat statements rejecting social media as 
always failing to comport with constitutional requirements tends to 
show a lack of understanding of the systems and their ever-increasing 
use in modern communication.223  Therefore, more detail is needed 
and more factors should be considered when examining the 
individual methods of communication.224 
B. New Test 
A new, more detailed test should make it evident as to whether the 
use of social media can be reasonably calculated to effect service.225  
The test proposed here should take the following factors into 
consideration.  First, are the broader means of communication 
publicly accessible?  Second, is the direct method to be used private 
to the defendant?  Third, is the communication directly targeted to the 
defendant?  Fourth, is there corroborative evidence that the targeted 
 
218. Id. at 576. 
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
220. Compare Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) 
(allowing email as a form of service under the same Mullane test), with Andrews v. 
McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla. 2014) (first citing 
Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855, 862 (Okla. 2003); then citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 
314–15) (denying email as a form of service under Mullane). 
221. See Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
222.  See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (calling into question limitations on service of 
process by email, such as lack of receipt confirmation, limited use of electronic 
signatures, system compatibility issues, and imprecise imaging technology); Andrews,  
341 P.3d at 54 (Winchester, J., dissenting) (noting that Facebook has two types of 
message formats). 
223. See Andrews, 341 P.3d at 51. 
224.  See id.; see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18. 
225.  See supra Section IV.A. 
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user is the correct one, and further, that the account is active?  Fifth, 
are there terms of service requirements that force users to display 
their actual identifying information?  Sixth and finally, do the broader 
means and the specific method of communication have the ability to 
transmit entire documents?  These factors, taken together, would give 
courts a better understanding of whether service by social media can 
be reasonably calculated to apprise the other party of proceedings 
against them.226 
 1.    Public Means 
The means by which notice is given should be public.  Just as 
anyone has access to a person walking in public, the mail, or even a 
newspaper, notice should only be allowed through electronic means 
to which anyone has access.227  This would exclude means such as 
private forum sites, where joining the forum requires a screener who 
has the option to accept or deny you.228  A private forum may exclude 
anyone it chooses.229  Rather, a public means would include most 
major social networks, such as Facebook or Twitter, which require 
only that the proper information be provided with no other delay or 
option to deny at the time of registration.230  Forcing a party to 
provide notice via public means would protect most individuals’ 
access to justice and keep the goals of service consistent: protecting 
the due process rights of individuals.231  Anyone with internet access 
 
226. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).  The old 
Mullane test was “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . .”  Id.  Compare this with the 
proposed 5-factor test. 
227.  Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.    
228.  Compare About Facebook, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) 
(an example of a public website that anyone can access), with About, DRUPAL, 
https://www.drupal.org/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (a private forum with a 
screening process). 
229.  See, e.g., Private Forums and Member-Only Sites, DRUPAL (Jan. 22, 2007), 
https://www.drupal.org/node/111576 (“A private forum is one which is only available 
to registered members, or to only a certain class of users (or ‘members’).”). 
230. Registration for either Facebook or Twitter requires only the input of identifying and 
contact information.  See How Do I Sign Up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/188157731232424 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016); 
Signing Up with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/100990 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
231. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 549–50. 
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(or even a local library) would have the ability to serve their 
opponent.232 
 2.    Private Method 
While the means of serving process should be public, the specific 
method of contact should be private.  Courts have attempted to 
protect privacy where possible.233  While anyone has access to the 
mail, only the intended recipient is allowed to open and read the 
contents of the letter.234  This would ensure that only the targeted 
individual is the most likely to be served.235  A standard Facebook 
post, or even a post on someone’s page would not be private.236  Only 
a post viewable solely by the recipient or a direct message would 
provide both reasonable notice and actual information to the intended 
recipient.237 
 3.    Direct Communication 
In order to ensure that the intended recipient of the communication 
actually receives the communication, the notice should be targeted 
directly to the intended user.238  Because sufficient service requires 
reasonable efforts to effect service, an indirect communication (such 
as a tweet) is no better than publication.239  Indirect communication is 
 
232. Libraries serve a particularly important part of communities where affluence is 
uncommon.  U.S. Public Libraries Provide Critical Access to Internet Services, AM. 
LIBR. ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/research/sites/ala.org.research/files/content/initiatives
/plftas/issuesbriefs/connectivitybrief_2009_10_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) 
(“Nearly all of America’s 16,604 public library buildings offer free public access to 
computers, to the Internet and to trained staff equipped to help . . . .”).  
233. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (upholding a 
woman’s right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) 
(recognizing privacy rights in a marriage and holding government interference with 
that privacy right to be unconstitutional). 
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012). 
235.  See id.  
236. Creating a standard Facebook post merely publishes the content to any number of 
your social connections on the site.  See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016).  Posting directly to another user’s “Timeline” will notify them 
of the publication, but will be viewable by anyone visiting that user’s page.  Id. 
237.  See How Do I Send a Private Message to a Page?, FACEBOOK, 
 https://www.facebook.com/help/142031279233975 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
238. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576. 
239. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“Chance 
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type 
inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area 
of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach 
him are large indeed.  The chance of actual notice is further reduced when as here the 
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offered in the hopes that, if the intended recipient does not see the 
notice, someone who knows the intended recipient will realize that 
the notice should be passed along.240  Electronic communication 
should be directed at the recipient to avoid the various, and well-
documented, problems that come along with publication.241 
 4.    Corroborating Evidence to Prove Accuracy and Activity 
Currently, courts examine the likelihood of a targeted user account 
being the correct user.242  That analysis should continue.  Mullane 
requires that notice be reasonably likely to apprise the opponent of 
the suit.243  For service to be effective, the plaintiff must have some 
evidence to show that the notice was served on the correct user’s 
account.244  There may be fifty different men named David Johnson 
in any given metro locale; the plaintiff must use corroborating 
indicators to show that the account served belongs to the correct 
David Johnson.245  Digital interactions such as events, pictures, or 
“check-in” locations, coupled with date and time stamps, can be used 
to show that the intended user owns and operates the account being 
served.246 
Furthermore, just as the correct user account should be 
corroborated, so too should some proof be given to show that the 
account is actually used.247  Proof of actual use would safeguard the 
Mullane requirements.248  This evidence is not difficult to attain from 
 
notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and 
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.”).  The statement made 
in Mullane holds true today for the public posting of social media content as it did in 
the mid-twentieth century for newspapers.  See id. 
240. Such intent is a hallmark of failure to provide sufficient notice.  See supra notes 130–
134 and accompanying text. 
241.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315–17. 
242. See FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013) (“Service by email alone comports with due process where a plaintiff 
demonstrates that the email is likely to reach the defendant.” (citing Gurung v. 
Malhotra, 279 F.R.D. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))). 
243. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604, 
613 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 404 (1900)). 
244. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276–77. 
245. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576. 
246. See id. 
247. Id. 
248.  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (chosen method of service must “reasonably” inform the 
defendant of the suit); see Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78 (following 
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most social networks.249  Any post would show activity, but many 
social media platforms and email services also allow for some form 
of read receipt.250  These receipts would allow the sender to confirm 
that the account was actually in use and provide reasonable assurance 
that the intended target was served.251 
 5.    Terms of Service Requirements 
Ensuring accuracy is a must when determining whether service of 
process was sufficient.252  Under current law, the primary inquiry for 
electronic service is to determine whether the account is correct.253  
While that inquiry should continue, courts should not end the analysis 
there; they should also consider the terms of service for the social 
media platform being used for service.254  Some social media 
platforms have terms of service that require the user to provide 
accurate identifying information when registering under pain of being 
banned from using the platform.255  Others, especially forums created 
for a small club or group, may be allowed or even encouraged to hide 
their true identity.256  Because of the low reliability of the information 
provided and stored by these platforms, they should be excluded from 
providing sufficient service of process if it is found that the terms of 
service for the webpage: (a) do not require correct information or (b) 
do not have the penalty of expulsion for failing to provide the correct 
information.257  This would include nearly all major social media 
 
service via Facebook, the defendant’s activity on his or her account would indicate 
whether or not there was proof of service). 
249.  See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78. 
250. See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78; see also Send Messages, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/487151698161671/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2016). 
251.  See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76 (citing Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 
06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007)); Wagner & Castillo, 
supra note 6, at 277–78. 
252. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276–77. 
253. Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
254.  See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276 (acknowledging during a discussion of 
account authenticity that “Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities 
requires users to provide real names and accurate, up-to-date information on their 
profile” and the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court accepted that 
“information on the defendant’s Facebook profile matched birth dates, lists of friends, 
and email addresses provided by defendant . . . .”). 
255. See id.  Even though there is little to stop someone from using a fake identity, any 
encouragement to aid societal decisions is helpful. 
256.  See Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, The Ethics of Disguised Identity in 
Social Media, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 447, 457–59 (2014). 
257.  See id.  
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platforms and provide some assurance that the information used to 
determine whether the account is the correct one is accurate.258 
 6.    Ability to Transmit the Entire Document 
Every examination into sufficiency of process must examine the 
contents of the alleged notice.259  An examination into service via 
social media is no different.260  The court should examine whether the 
method of contact allows the sender to provide documentation, which 
would prove to the reader that the information is true.261  One of the 
problems with electronic service is its believability.262  If a Facebook 
user looks to his or her account and sees a direct message that states: 
“You are hereby notified that your presence in X Court will be 
required on Y Date,” the user is likely to be suspicious as to its 
authenticity.263  If, however, that same user were to receive a message 
from someone he or she knows and that message had official 
documents attached with the same information and the seal of the 
court and/or the signature of the clerk, that message would be more 
likely to be believed.264 
This requirement would somewhat limit the technology capable of 
being used to provide sufficient service.265  Not every platform 
allows a user to send a scanned or photographed copy of a document 
to another user.266  Nevertheless, this requirement would allow a 
 
258. See id. (discussing social media sites which do not require the use of true identities 
and those which purposefully provide anonymity); see also Wagner & Castillo, supra 
note 6, at 276–77. 
259.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (quoting 
Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911)). 
260.  See id. (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604, 613 (1914); Roller v. 
Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 404 (1900)); Knapp supra note 1, at 563. 
261.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 314; Knapp, supra note 1, at 563, 576. 
262. So-called “spam” emails have created a culture where anything claiming to be 
“official” is subject to scrutiny by the reader.  See Arik Hesseldahl, Why the Spam 
Keeps Coming, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2004, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2004/11/
19/cx_ah_1119tentech.html.  By attaching a copy of the actual official document, the 
reader would be far more likely to believe the contents.  See Knapp, supra note 1, at 
576. 
263. See Hesseldahl, supra note 262. 
264. See id.; Knapp, supra note 1, at 576. 
265.  Knapp, supra note 1, at 576. 
266. Twitter does not support full documentation, forcing users to rely on third-party 
services to do so.  Jason Kincaid, TwitDoc: Proving that Every File Format Will 
Eventually Be Shareable over Twitter, TECHCRUNCH (May 8, 2009), 
https://techcrunch.com/2009/05/08/twitdoc-proving-that-every-file-format-will-
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plaintiff to send accurate and official information to the targeted user 
with a much higher probability that the receiving user would believe 
the information to be accurate.267 
 7.    Proof of Actual Receipt 
The final note, though not a factor, is, in reality, a sufficiency of 
evidence analysis.  The court should examine whether the method of 
contact within the social media platform includes some indication of 
a proof of receipt.268  For example, a direct message to a Facebook 
user shows when the user viewed it, even if that person does not reply 
to the message.269  Not all platforms, however, currently display 
when another person reads your message (e.g., Twitter being one of 
these).270  This requirement should act as a method of weeding out 
weak evidence that a user has had the opportunity to see the notice.271  
If there is little or no activity on the account and there is no way to 
tell if the message has been received, such information tends to show 
a lack of notice.272  Conversely, if there is either little activity but a 
read receipt or much activity and no read receipt, the court should 
slide the scale in the direction of allowing service.273 
 
eventually-be-shareable-over-twitter/; see, e.g., TWITDOC, http://twitdoc.com/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016).  Because of this, service via Twitter would be unlikely to 
comport with the test propounded here.  Decisions like St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait 
Fin. House, No. 3:16-CV-3240-LB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
30, 2016), though dealing with an international defendant, would likely be reversed, 
or at least require a deeper analysis than was offered. 
267.  See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citing 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604, 613 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 
398, 404 (1900)); Knapp supra note 1, at 563, 576. 
268. See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78. 
269. See Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2016). 
270. See David Nield, Can You See if a DM Has Been Read on Twitter?, TECH IN OUR 
EVERYDAY LIFE, http://techin.oureverydaylife.com/can-see-dm-read-twitter-2123.html 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
271.  See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 278 (“[C]ourts must order the alternative 
notice most reasonably calculated to provide notice . . . .”). 
272.  Cf. id. at 277–78 (discussing how posting on one’s Facebook wall tends to provide 
notice). 
273.  See id. (discussing that posting on a Facebook wall is an example of “alternative 
service” that “present[s] an increasingly high probability of providing notice in 
today’s tech-driven society”); see also Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76 (quoting Philip 
Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007)). 
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C. Comparative Improvements 
If this test had been used by the courts in Fortunato and Andrews, 
the reasoning of those two decisions, if not the holding themselves, 
would likely have been different.274  In Fortunato, the plaintiff failed 
to place any facts before the court to show whether the targeted user 
was the correct one.275  The court’s general skepticism was born out 
in its holding,276 but if this new test had been considered the court 
would be forced to recognize that while this particular instance of 
service may have lacked sufficient facts and evidence, the practice of 
providing notice via social media can be constitutionally sufficient.277  
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s broad holding in 
Andrews would have been significantly narrower, if not flipped.  The 
court relied on the possibility that no notification would pass to the 
actual user.278  This fact, however, excluded any analysis as to 
whether the account was actually used or if the plaintiff attained a 
read receipt.279  Such an analysis may have forced the court to further 
examine the workings of communication by social media rather than 
flatly reject it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many courts’ quick dismissal of social media service because of 
the “unorthodoxy” of new methods will push courts into further 
inefficiencies.280  The movement of both state and federal courts to 
digital filing systems has demonstrated how efficient electronic 
methods may be.281  The next step in the litigation process to go 
 
274.  Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (denying Defendant’s application to serve third-party 
complaint by email, Facebook, and delivery to Plaintiff, but granting application for 
alternate service by publication); Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 
341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla. 2014) (holding that a message sent by mother to putative 
father via a social networking website did not provide putative father with notice (first 
citing Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855; then citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950))). 
275. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
276.  Id. at *2–3. 
277. See Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
278. See Andrews, 341 P.3d at 51 (first citing Booth, 70 P.3d at 865; then citing Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 315). 
279. See id. 
280.  See Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
281. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 562. 
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digital should be service.  This is born out in the progression of 
technological inclusion in service jurisprudence.282 
This new test may not create a universal method of determining 
service sufficiency. Its use in a court’s analysis, however, would 
force the court to interact with the digital world and manipulate 
digital communication methods within the existing realm of service 
jurisprudence.283  That manipulation turns into wider use of digital 
communication; the use turns into stronger jurisprudence and a better 
understanding of the due process rights belonging to citizens of the 
United States. 
 
282. See supra Part II. 
283. See supra Part IV. 
